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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Trial Court erred in applying the law to 
the facts of the case concerning contract interpretation, stan-
dards of ambiguity, unconscionability, mutuality and whether a 
contract is illusory. 
2. Whether there are sufficient findings by the trial 
court upon which to base its Order that the lease in question is 
not ambiguous or unconscionable. 
3. Whether it was error for the trial court to fail to 
aPPly principals of contract interpretation wherein ambiguity in 
a document are to be construed against the party drafting the 
document. 
4. Whether it was error for the trial court to fail to 
consider the Affidavits of the Plaintiff/Appellant and of Gloria 
Erickson and to make no findings thereon. 
STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
None. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of a Summary Judgment Order on an 
issue of contract interpretation issued in the Third Judicial 
District Court. The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to 
the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
under Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(h). 
STATEMENT ON THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a decision rendered in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, by the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno, on the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment. The case arose by Plaintiff filing a Complaint on July 
22, 1987, and a Motion for Summary Judgment November 25, 1987, on 
which a hearing was held December 1, 1987. Judge Uno issued a 
written Memorandum Decision which was entered January 4, 1988, 
ruling against Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum 
Decision attached as Exhibit B hereto). An Order and Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on April 4, 1988. 
(Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached as 
Exhibit C hereto). This Order was appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court and subsequently transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This case involves Plaintiff who is a successor in 
interest to a lease executed April 29, 1977 between William N. 
Jennings as Lessor and Defendant, Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc., as Lessee. (Lease attached as Exhibit A.) The lease allows 
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Defendant to erect and maintain a large billboard on Plaintiff's 
property in exchange for an annual rent. Plaintiff is the third 
owner of the property subject to the lease agreement since it was 
executed and she acquired the property by purchase in 1983. At 
all times material to this proceeding it was Plaintiff's 
understanding that the lease term was ten years and that lease 
would thus expire on April, 1987. At that time Plaintiff 
attempted to terminate the lease with the Defendants and was told 
that they considered the lease term to be for twenty years. 
On Summary Judgment the Plaintiff argued that the lease 
was unconscionable, illusory, ambiguous and should be construed 
against the Defendant who drafted the document to find that 
Plaintiff could terminate the lease after the ten year term. 
Judge Uno determined that "the terms of the contract are clear 
and unequivocal," that the contract was not unconscionable by 
present or subsequent events, and that it stated a lease term for 
ten years with an automatic renewal option for the term of the 
lease which, in effect, created a twenty year term. Judge Uno 
also ruled that the lease was binding on all successor owners of 
the premises. (Exhibit B, R. 220-225.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Reagan Outdoor Advertising currently has a 
billboard at 2735 South 2000 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
(hereinafter the "Premises"). Plaintiff Lorraine Miller, owns the 
premises upon which Defendant maintains it's billboard which she 
purchased in late 1983. (Exhibit E, Miller Affidavit, para. 1). 
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Defendant entered into a lease agreement (hereinafter 
"Lease") on or about April 29, 1977, with William Jennings, a 
prior owner of the premises providing that the Defendant could 
construct and maintain a billboard on the premises in exchange 
for a $240.00 annual rental fee. (Exhibit A.) 
The lease states that it is effective "for a term of ten 
years commencing on or before the first day of May, 1977". 
(Lease, Exhibit A, para. 2.) 
Defendant did construct and has maintained this 
billboard on said premises up until the present time. (Exhibit D, 
Miller Affidavit, para. 3, R-54). 
Plaintiff purchased the premises on which the billboard 
is located in 1983, from Gloria Erickson who informed her that 
the billboard lease term was ten years and that it would expire 
in May of 1987. (Exhibit F, Miller Affidavit, para. 2; Exhibit E, 
Erickson Affidavit, para. 1-4, R-53; 79.) 
Plaintiff notified Defendant by letter dated January 26, 
1987, and by Certified Letter dated April 29, 1987, that she 
desired to terminate the lease and requested that Defendant 
remove the billboard from the premises. Defendant refused to 
vacate the premises and told Plaintiff that he interpreted the 
lease as providing for a twenty year term. (Exhibit D, Miller 
Affidavit, para. 4 & 5, R-53.) 
The lease provides for termination exclusively at the 
option of the Lessee (Defendant) prior to the end of the lease 
term, upon various conditions. (Lease, para. 5). 
-4-
In a separate paragraph from the lease term, the lease 
contains a renewal-type clause as follows: 
'"^ his lease shall continue on the same terms and con-
ditions for a like successive period, thereafter, this 
lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and 
conditions for a like successive period or periods, 
unless Lessor delivers to Lessee notice of termination 
within ninety days of the end of said term." (Lease, 
para. 4.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. That the lease is ambiguous as a matter of law and 
should be construed against the drafter to find it can be ter-
minated by Plantiff Lessor after a ten year term. 
II. That the lease is so overwhelmingly favorable to the 
Defendant Lessor as to make the lease unconscionable, and thus 
not binding on Plaintiff. 
III. That the Defendant is not bound by the lease which 
makes the contract illusory and void, and not binding on the 
Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENTS 
Introduction 
At all material times Plaintiff understood that the 
lease agreement with Defendant Reagan Outdoor Advertising could 
be terminated ten years from its inception, that is, April, 1987. 
Plaintiff took all possible steps to understand and confirm that 
this was the case when she purchased the premises in 1983. These 
steps included personal review of the contract, obtaining a legal 
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opinion, reviewing the title report and receiving assurances 
from the seller Gloria Erickson. (See Affidavits, Exhibits D, E, 
F.) All of these sources assured or confirmed to Plaintiff that 
the lease could be terminated after ten years and that the 
billboard could then be removed. Plaintiff submits that a review 
of the lease and the facts herein reveal a clear ambiguity on the 
length of the lease term which should be resolved against the 
Defendant who drafted the contract. 
The District Court decision on Summary Judgment did not 
even address the issues of ambiguity or lack of mutuality in its 
decision which is reversible error. Plaintiff submits that this 
is not a case of wanting to be relieved from an undesireable 
bargain but that the lease contains patent ambiguities which 
Plaintiff, her predecessors in interest, the title company and 
several attorneys have all confirmed. 
Other defects exist in the lease which arguably lacks 
mutuality, is thus illusory, and because of its deceptive 
language and one-sidedness is also unconscionable. For these 
reasons the lease should be found not binding on Plaintiff. Judge 
Uno failed to properly apply these principles of contract 
interpretation to the facts herein which, if properly applied 
require this court to find the lease is now terminated and rule 
for Plaintiff. 
I. THE COURT SHOULD FIND AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE 
LEASE IS AMBIGUOUS. 
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Plaintiffs submit that the question of ambiguity is 
patent on the face of the lease and supported by a review of the 
circumstances surrounding the lease history. On review of an 
issue of law this Court is not required to give deference to the 
trial court's judgment. Forbes v. St. Marks, 81 Ut.Adv.Rpt 18. 
The trial court herein in fact ignores Plaintiff's arguments on 
ambiguity and lack of mutuality focusing instead on unconsciona-
bility. Plaintiff submits that there are several ambiguities in 
the term provisions of the lease which make it impossible to 
determine what the parties' intended and must be construed 
against the drafter of the contract Reagan Outdoor Advertising. 
A. Contradictory Terms in the Lease Create Ambiguity. 
The lease in part provides: 
The lessor does hereby grant and convey to the lessee... 
for a term of ten years commencing on or before 1st day 
of May 1977 
This lease shall continue on the same terms and con-
ditions for a like successive period; thereafter this 
lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and 
conditions for a like successive period or periods, 
unless lessor delivers to lessee notice of termination 
within ninety days of the end of said term. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The above quoted langauge granted to Defendant explicitly a term 
of ten years, yet also appears to provide for continuation of the 
lease term for a "like successive period." By this language the 
Defendant may have contemplated a minimum term of twenty years, 
although drafted as two ten year terms. The Plaintiff herein 
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however, did not have this understanding and due to the contra-
dictory provisions the intent of the original parties cannot be 
determined from the face of the lease. 
This Court is thus presented with a question of 
construction and in Utah, this lease must be construed against 
the drafter, in this case the Defendant Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising. The Supreme Court has stated it thus: 
"The well-established rule in Utah is that any uncer-
tainty with respect to construction of a contract should 
be resolved against the party who had drawn the 
agreement". 
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). See also 
§206 Restatement of Contracts, (Second) comment (a). 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has held in Russell v. 
Valentine, 376 P.2d 548 (Utah, 1962), that where lease renewal 
provisions are unclear, they should be construed against the 
drafter. The Defendant herein drafted the lease; it now relies on 
the ambiguity, written into the lease for its own benefit, to 
retain the premises for another ten years. Construing the Lease 
against its drafter requires a conclusion that it was for a term 
of ten years and that Plaintiff's interpretation prevail. 
B. Use of the Phrase "Said Term" in the Lease 
Term and Renewal Provisions is Ambiguous 
In the lease language quoted above it is clear that the 
Plaintiff, as Lessor, has a right to terminate the agreement 
"within ninety days at the end of "said term", (emphasis added). 
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What is unclear is what the phrase "said term" refers to. Since 
this phrase is subject to more than one interpretation it is 
therefore ambiguous. 
Plaintiff's submit that the phrase "said term" can be 
interpreted three different ways: 
(i) to refer only to the initial "term of ten years"; 
(ii) to refer only to the subsequent "like successive 
period" or, "like successive period or periods"; and, 
(iii) to refer to the initial phrase "term of ten years", 
the subsequent phrase "like successive period" and the phrase 
"like successive period or periods". 
Importantly, the phrase "said term" may be interpreted 
to refer only to the initial "term of ten years." The word "term" 
is used in the phrase "same term" and the phrase "term of ten 
years" although it is never used in the phrases "like successive 
period" or "like successive period or periods". Thus, Plaintiff's 
belief that she could terminate the lease after one ten year term 
is unquestionably a reasonable construction of the contract 
language. 
Ambiguity is created as the phrase "said term" may also 
be interpreted to refer to the initial language "term of ten 
years" the subsequent "like successive period" and "the like suc-
cessive period or periods." Each of these phrases pertain to the 
duration of the agreement and it is impossible to determine what 
is intended on the face of the document. 
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It is evident that Defendant Reagan Outdoor Advertising 
apparently believes that because of the placement of the phrase 
"said term" that phrase refers only to the subsequent "like suc-
cessive period" or the "like successive period or periods". 
However, the phrase "said term" can definitely be interpreted in 
several fashions as indicated above. Notwithstanding Defendant's 
belief, it is Plaintiffs position that since the phrase "said 
term" is subject to more than one interpretation, that the ter-
mination provision is patently ambiguous. Because it is ambi-
guous, the termination provision must be construed against Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, the drafter of the agreement and Plaintiff 
should have been allowed to terminate the agreement "within 
ninety days of the end of" the initial "ten year term". Timely 
notice of termination was sent to Defendants and thus the 
agreement should be deemed terminated. 
C. Applying Rules of Contract Interpretation Requires a. 
Finding of a. Ten Year Lease Term, 
The Restatement of Contracts (Second) sets forth certain 
standards of preference in contract interpretation, including, 
the rule that "specific terms and exact terms are given greater 
weight than general language". Section 203(c), comment (e) to 
that section states that: 
"Attention and understanding are likely to be in 
better focus when language is specific or exact, and in 
case of conflict, the specific or exact term is more 
likely to express the meaning of the parties with 
respect to the situation than the general language." 
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In the lease in question attention is directed to the 
blanks in the second paragraph which are filled in with the date 
the lease term begins and where it states "a term of ten years 
commencing on or before (blank) day of (blank), 19 ...M. 
Applying this rule of interpretation requires the Court to uphold 
Plaintiff's view that the lease creates a ten year term which is 
an explicit exact term rather than the ambiguous and deceptive 
language buried in the contract which arguably creates an automa-
tic renewal provision and a twenty year term (although without 
ever using the word "renewal" or "lease term"). Plaintiff thus 
requests a declaration by this Court that the lease is ambiguous 
as a matter of lav/ and that the ambiguity be resolved against the 
Defendant. 
II. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT BOUND BY THE TERMS OF ITS LEASE; 
THE CONTRACT IS THEREFORE, ILLUSORY. 
When the entirety of the lease is examined, it is evi-
dent that it can be terminated at the sole option of the 
Defendant without limitation. It thus becomes clear that only one 
party is bound by this lease, the Plaintiff herein, which makes 
the contract illusory and void. Although this argument was pre-
sented at the Summary Judgment hearing, Judge Jlno makes no 
reference to this argument in his Memorandum Decision. 
Defendant has reserved for itself, the contractual right 
of termination at its sole option as specified in paragraph 5 of 
the lease; to wit: 
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1. If the advertising space becomes "obstructed so as to 
lessen the advertising value of any of Lessee's 
signs"; 
2. If "traffic is diverted or reduced"; 
3. If the use of any sign is "prevented or restricted by 
law" ; 
4. If "for any reason a building permit for erection or 
modification is refused;" 
Reason one and two are entirely subject to the discre-
tion of the Defendant to interpret and thus present no real 
limitations. The fourth reason presented definitely gives the 
Defendant unbounded discretion to terminate the contract at his 
sole option. The building codes which govern Defendant's adver-
tising are undoubtedly within the Defendant's expertise and 
knowledge. Defendant could easily submit a building permit for 
modification of the billboard that does not comply with appli-
cable codes, expecting and desiring refusal of it's permit. Such 
refusal would create in Defendant, the contractual power to ter-
minate the lease. The lease provides that Defendant may terminate 
the lease if the building permit is refused "for any reason". The 
Salt Lake City Ordinances on advertising regulations found at 
Title 51, Chapter 7, et seq., contain explicit standards which 
are easily breached. Even the failure to include a required docu-
ment in a permit application can result in disapproval. Rev.Ord. 
SLC §51-7-308. Such an omission comes within the contractual 
language giving Defendant the power to terminate his lease for 
that reason. That such a reason is within the exclusive control 
-12-
of the Defendant, that it can be contrived, that it can be used 
by Defendant to avoid it's contractual obligations, renders the 
lease invalid as unconscionable and as an illusory contract. 
Such mutuality was at issue in the case Resource 
Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company, Inc., 
706 P.2d 1028 (1985, Utah), where the Court said: 
"When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a 
statement made in such vague or conditional terms that 
the person making it commits himself to nothing, the 
alleged 'promise' is said to be 'illusory'. An illusory 
promise, neither binds the person making it, nor func-
tions as consideration for a return promise." 
In this case, the lease gives only the Defendant-Lessor 
specific termination privileges prior to the end of the lease 
term and three of the four grounds for termination are wholly 
within its control. The lease was thus one terminable at the will 
of one party, the option of the Defendant. 
Dealing with renewal rather than termination, in an opi-
nion without extensive analysis, the Washington Supreme Court 
considered an analogous fact situation in Logan v. Time Oil 
Company, 437 P.2d 192 (Wash. 1968). The lessee of a gas station 
sued for specific performance, relying on a provision giving it 
the right to extend a ten-year lease for an additional ten years. 
The Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the "so-called 
lease [was] lacking in mutuality and binding upon neither party 
for a fixed term," Id. at 193. Therefore it "created no more than 
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a tenancy from month to month, and, ...was not subject to 
renewal or extension against the will of the lessor." Id. 
Defendant Lessee's power of termination in this case produce a 
similar result and this Court should declare that the lease is an 
illusory contract and therefore void for lack of mutuality. 
III. THE TERMS OF THE LEASE ARE SO OVERWHELMINGLY 
FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT AS TO MAKE THE LEASE 
UNCONSCIONABLE 
The Defendant, or it's agents, drafted the lease. As 
presented to Plaintiff's predecessor, the lease is a form 
contract consisting of eight unnumbered paragraphs, containing 
blanks for the insertion of the date, commencement of rental 
term, property address, and rental amount. A property owner 
reviewing this lease would very likely believe that the only term 
open for negotiation was price. That property owner, even after 
carefully reading the lease, would be unlikely to understand how 
favorable to the Defendant the lease was. 
The contradictory clauses can be interpreted to create a 
lease for a term of ten years or for a term of twenty years. The 
Plaintiff interprets the lease as a term of ten years based on 
paragraph 2 giving the lessee the right to maintain outdoor 
advertising structures on the premises "for a term of ten years" 
which is explicitly written in the lease. In contrast, Defendant 
interprets this as a lease for a term of twenty years based on 
paragraph 4 of the lease which states "this lease shall con-
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tinue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive 
period". Defendant claims this clause gives it the automatic 
right to lease the premises for an additional ten years, creating 
in effect, a twenty year lease. Such a construction is 
unconscionable. 
Granting the Defendant an automatic twenty year lease-
hold renders the ten year term meaningless, except as used by the 
Defendant to double the stated term. If Defendant desired a term 
of twenty years, it could have easily created a document expli-
citly stating that the term of the lease was to be twenty years. 
This Court should not now sanction such misleading practices 
which have no other purpose then to deceive an innocent lessor, 
by allowing Defendant an additional ten years. 
Utah has described unconscionability as a strong ine-
quality in bargaining power and as a contract "in which no 
decent, fairminded person would view the ensuing result without 
being possessed of a profound sense of injustice". Resource 
Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company, Inc., 
706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (1985), (quoting Carlson v. Hamilton, 332 
P.2d 989 (Utah 1958). The Court further stated that substantive 
unconscionability "is indicated by contract terms so one-sided as 
to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party." Id. (quoting 
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 445 (Utah, 1983)). See also, 
Bray Livestock, Inc. v. Utah Carriers, Inc., 61 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 44 
(filed 7/10/87.) When read with the provision granting lessee a 
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ten-year term, as it must be, the provision granting continuation 
"on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period" 
is a semi-concealed and self-serving provision; and it is thus 
unconscionable. The deceptive nature of the language creating the 
alleged twenty year lease term claimed by Defendant, alone or 
combined with Defendant's unilateral right of termination, 
creates a gross disparity in terms which is unconscionable. 
This lease is also unconscionable as it is terminable at 
the will of one party, the option of the Defendant, and is sc 
one-sided as to destroy any implied good faith limitation. The 
present situation also contains many of the elements of a tran-
saction which the Utah Supreme Court held in the Resource 
Management case were substantively unconscionable. Supra 706 
P.2nd at 1042. In this case there is a gross disparity of 
bargaining power and contradictory printed terms which are hidden 
in the contract. The facts of Plaintiff's case also contain ele-
ments of procedural unconscionability as noted in the Resource 
Management case such as "the use of a printed form or boiler 
plate contracts drawn skillfully by the party in the strongest 
economic position...in language that is incomprehensible to a 
layman or that diverts his attention from the problems raised by 
them or the rights given up through them." Supra 706 P.2d 1042. 
In totality, these elements precluded a meaningful choice on the 
part of Mr. Jennings and his successors in interest to this 
contract whose terms are unreasonably favorable to the Defendant. 
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This Court should thus hold that the contract is unconscionable 
and illusory and find it void. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Christopher v. Larson Ford 
Sales, 557 P.2d 1009 (1976) examined the question of whether an 
implied warranty disclaimer must be conspicuous which presents 
identical policy issues to the case at bar. 
"[lit is the policy of the law to look with disfavor 
upon semi-concealed or obscured self-protective provi-
sions of a contract prepared by one party, which the 
other is not likely to notice. We think it is a correct 
and salutary rule, that where there are provisions of 
this character in a contract, either buried in other 
provisions in fine print or are otherwise semi-concealed 
or secreted in some manner, such as being found only by 
reference to the backside of the document, they should 
not be binding on the signer (buyer) unless it is shown 
that the provision was actually called to his 
attention." 
Id. at 1012. See also, Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 400 P.2d 503, 505 
(Utah 1965) (holding it was unfair to allow a party to set forth 
a clear promise to induce acceptance where another provision 
takes away that promise). 
Although the words of the term and renewal provisions 
may be understood in isolation, when read together they are 
deceptive and ambiguous giving a distinct advantage to the 
Lessor. As the cases reflect, the policy and letter of the law in 
Utah is against the taking of such unfair advantage and requires 
a ruling in Plaintiff's favor. 
IV. THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE LEASE HISTORY 
SUPPORT A FINDING OF AMBIGUITY AND UNCONSION-
IBILTY HEREIN 
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The lease contract in question states that it shall be 
"bindinq upon the successors and assigns of the parties" thereto. 
Judge Uno also specifically found Plaintiff bound by this lease 
as a successor in interest. Plaintiff does not dispute that she 
understood this language and had notice of this contract at the 
time she purchased the property in 1983. Notwithstanding this, 
Plaintiff also always had the understanding that the lease could 
be terminated after a ten year term. That is, she understood that 
she could terminate the contract ten years after it became effec-
tive in April, 1977. (Exhibit F, Miller Affidavit; R-85.) 
Plaintiff's understanding of the ten year lease term 
came directly from her predecessor in interest, Gloria Erickson 
who sold the property to her. Mrs. Erickson purchased the pro-
perty from William Jennings who was the original signer of the 
lease contract with the Defendant, Reagan Advertising. Mrs. 
Erickson's Affidavit states that when she purchased the property 
from Mr. Jennings she first learned of the lease contract at the 
time of closing and the lease term was represented to be ten 
years. (Exhibit E, Erickson Affidavit; R-79.) This fact was set 
forth in the closing documents which were not disputed by Mr. 
Jennings, a copy of which is attached to her Affidavit. (R-82.) 
Plaintiff's Affidavit contains a copy of her title insurance 
policy which also confirms that the Reagan Outdoor Advertising 
lease term was considered to be a ten year term. (R-88-91.) 
Additionally, both of these parties had their respective attor-
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neys review the lease contract at the time of their purchase of 
the property and both attorneys confirmed that it was a ten year 
lease term which they could terminate at the end of that time. 
(Exhibit F, Miller Affidavit, R-85 Exhibit E, Erickson Affidavit, 
R-79.) 
The Utah Supreme Court case of Hayes v. Gibbs 169 P.2d 
781 (Utah 1946) is instructive on whether restrictive covenants 
bind successive purchasers beyond the original parties and 
applies a five part test. (Case copy, R-92.) Although whether the 
contract is binding is not in dispute here, this case states the 
importance of reviewing the chain of title and understandings of 
prior purchasers as to what restrictions may exist on the pro-
perty. In it's analysis, the Court refers to the title record as 
showing certain restrictions and states that subsequent purcha-
sers are thus chargeable with the knowledge of the purpose for 
which those restrictions v/ere made. Supra, 169 P. 2d at 784. In 
the present case, all subsequent purchasers from the original 
covenantee (William Jennings) and their attorneys understood the 
lease term to be ten years. The chain of title which these 
purchasers reviewed as represented by their title companies also 
confirmed that the lease was to be ten years. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that the title 
company acting for Mr. Jennings was his agent when they prepared 
the closing documents for his sale of the property to Mrs. 
Erickson. That title company documented the Defendant's lease as 
one for ten years. (R-82.) 
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Without the benefit of Mr. Jennings personal testimony, 
the Court must construe the circumstances in this case to find 
the most consistent, reasonable interpretation of this lease 
term. Plaintiff submits that the provisions of this lease are 
more consistent in every way with a ten year term then with an 
extended term and many practical elements support this view. For 
instance, it is unreasonable to believe a landowner would 
knowingly commit to a twenty year term without any formula to 
adjust rent, or agree to a lease which gives him no right to ter-
minate before twenty years while giving the tenant essentially a 
unilateral right to terminate any time. These elements favor an 
interpretation that a shorter term lease was intended. 
It is also possible to construe the Defendant's reading 
of the lease and the alleged renewal clause as creating a "per-
petual" lease. Courts traditionally disfavor perpetual leases and 
they are only upheld if the intent of the parties is clearly 
expressed. In the case of Burke v. Permian Ford Lincoln Mercury, 
621 P.2d 1119 (New Mexico 1981), the Court states the following: 
"[w]ere we to accept the trial court's interpretation of 
the lease, Tas allowing successive renewals] the 
landlord would be placed in an untenable position 
whereby he would have no right to terminate the lease, 
no right to negotiate a fair rental price that reflects 
the burden of inflation and taxation, and no means of 
relieving the property of it's encumbrance. Without a 
clear manifestation of the landowner's intent to assume 
this position, we cannot allow a trial court to imply 
such intent by it's construction of a poorly written 
instrument". (Case copy, R-107.) 
In the present case, the Court should also consider the practical 
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aspects of this case which, if Defendant's arguments were 
accepted, would bind the Plaintiff to an unfair and unexpected 
result and one which was never understood to be the case by the 
Plaintiff or her predecessors. 
The issue facing the Court is basically to interpret in 
light of the available evidence and by applying rules of 
contract construction. The affidavits establish that this 
contract has consistently been interpreted as a ten year lease. 
None of the successors in interest to Mr. Jennings were informed 
or understood that there was a renewal provision or continuation 
clause which would make the lease term twenty years as Defendant 
argues. Indeed, the word "renew" never appears in the lease, 
rather, misleading language is used referring to "successive 
periods". The proven effect of these words was to mislead all of 
the successors in interest to Mr. Jennings, that is, Mrs. 
Erickson and the Plaintiff; both of their attorneys; and two 
title companies, all of whom construed the term to be ten years. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that the lease is ambiguous and, as 
such, must be construed against the drafter, Defendant Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising. Additonally, the lease language is deceptive 
and overwhelmingly favorable to the Defendant making it lacking 
in mutuality, illusory, unconscionable and therefore void. For 
the reasons stated herein, this Court should find the lease term 
expired in April, 1987, and is no longer binding on Plaintiff. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of November, 
1983. 
<7. 
i MASELIUS SUZANNE
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the attorney for Defendant/Respondent, Mr. 
Douglas T. Hall, 1775 North 900 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84116, postage prepaid this / day of November, 1988. 
31200(6) 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LORRAINE MILLER, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, ) GLORIA ERICKSON 
v, ) 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah ) 
Corporation, formerly known as ) 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, ) 
Inc., a Utah Corporation, ) 
) Civil No. 87-04928 
Defendant. ) (Judge Raymond Uno) 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW Gloria Erickson who upon her oath deposes and 
says: 
1. I am a previous owner of the premises located at 2735 
South 20th East, Salt Lake City, Utah, on which Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising has a billboard. I purchased this property from 
William Jennings in May, 1978, and sold it to Lorraine Miller in 
1-9*5. I first learned of the billboard lease to Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising about the time of closing on my purchase of the pro-
*mT? 
perty from Mr. Jennings in 1978. I learned of the lease from the 
title company which told me it was a ten year term lease which 
began April 29, 1977. The closing statement from Utah Title 
Company at the time of my purchase also reflects this to be the 
term of the lease. A copy of that statement is attached to this 
Affidavit as Exhibit A. 
2. The closing documents were reviewed personally by Mr. 
Jennings and myself and he did not dispute the fact that the 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising Lease was listed as a ten year term. 
3. After I took over the Jennings property I received no 
payment under the billboard lease and contacted my attorney, Lee 
Pratt, to review the situation and determine my rights. Mr. Pratt 
informed me that the lease was proper, that I could not terminate 
it, and that I had to wait out the term of the lease which he 
stated was ten years from April 29, 1977. A copy of the letter I 
received from this Attorney is attached hereto, dated October 13, 
1978. Although this letter does not assess the term of the lease 
this issue was discussed with Mr. Pratt and his conclusion was 
that it was a valid lease for ten years at which time I could 
terminate the lease. 
4. When I sold the property to Lorraine Miller in 1985, 
and I told her that it was a lease for ten years at which time it 
could be terminated by her. This was my belief based
 kon my con-
tact with Mr. Jennings, the closing documents from Utah Title, my 
own reading of the lease and the legal reviews I had done of the 
lease. 
DATED this l«b^ — day of December, 1987. 
GLORIA ERICSSON 
y< 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / ^ day of 
December, 1987. ^^^/^ w\, / 
NOTARY PUBLIC <*-/•/ / 
Residing at: dn uf £ g/<r-c 
My Commission Expires: 
24301 
CIAR TITLE CQXPANY 
355-7533 
629 East 400 South 
Salt Loko City. Utah 84102 
1—Seller.. WILLIAM M. JENNINGS 
PATSIE A. JENNINGS 
CLOSING STATEMENT 
Address .. . 
Our File No 
Listing No. 
T-48276 
Phone. 
2—Buyer GLORIA. S. ERICKSON 
GLORIA GAY ERICKSON 
Address 
Phone 
9. AssiCNMnn o? CONTRACT FO;; S!:CITITV vrp?osrs 
Assignor: WILLIAM K. jrNTTVGr and PATSIK A. JENNIKGS 
T'r H-«i*si::r w~<. o r r T OF *n-:r TOINTY OF SALT 
1J3T 
My >" 1*77 
T -v ??. 1977 
: ' W9D/G1F 
11 
12. 
13. 
Assignee: 
Arount : 
Dated: 
Recorded: 
Entry No.: 
Book/Pace:
10. LIEN 
flairwint: 
Amount: 
For: 
Recorded: 
Entry Ko.: 
Book/Pare: 
i. \Tijo*: WITPLY? ^ DO:-: vrrvpury ASSOCIATES, 
CU::<I:I:AL CONTRACTS 
$4,15';.'JO 
Contracted nfehabij.5tation work including 
exterior, earnertrr, reoflr.p, plunging, 
heating and electrical 
April ?0f 197fi 
309555f 
4658/H13 
rKRFCOPvDEri LEASE 
Lessor: 
Lessee: 
Terr:: 
Dated: 
FEDERAL TAX LIEN 
Ta^paypr: 
Amount: 
Dated; 
Recorded: 
Entry Xe.: 
W!!. II. JLHKITCS dba BILL'S SUPBPEY 
PFAC-AJ- CIJTPOC;; A E W . P I I S I : ^ ; , i:;c. 
10 Year*! 
April 2° , 1C77 
V,ITLT,\>' J*V/' rt 
lX56.°" 
!;ot Dated 
February 26, Is-73 
252071^ 
.--! PA1ST' RE-' 
The terms and conditions of tlr.t cr^rr, Aptcfcr^ rt cater* July 171 
3978, as disclosed bv Vnrrnntv Dt«H ?***< f fa:tiv.it. 25 I°70, recorded 
August 26, 1970, as Entry Ko. 23*7451, in Book 2P.91, atppape 
6^ 8 of Official Kccorcls. It: v±U >e n* cersrry to furr.is1: e copy 
of said Agreement tc Utab T*t7e n:..: -V street <.o .r"v, Jrfore title 
Insurance vill be Iftsued. 
* * • u 
C»I,YI>I: £c P U A T T 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
3 il • S O U T f - r 5 T f l T £ ; S T ^ £ L i . T 
SALT LAKE CITY. U T A H 6 < I M 
S ~ - v £ N £ C . T O E 
October 13, 1978 
Mr. & Mrs. Frank Erickson 
2796 South 20th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Erickson: 
I have looked at the Reagan contract. I find in the con-
tract an absolute requirement that the lessee shall pay the 
amount of $240.00 annually, payable in quarterly installments. 
If in fact he has not paid these quarterly installments and you 
have done nothing to indicate a reason why he should not pay or 
have in no way extended his time for payment, then he is in 
breach of the lease. 
If he is in breach of the lease, then you are justified in 
refusing to accept his late payment and in telling him that the 
lease is terminated. I am sure, however, that in view of the 
investment involved he is going to dispute the termination in 
any way that he can. Thus, I caution you that in any conversa-
tions that you may have with him you should not recognize any 
time extension or any reason why he should not have paid, if in 
fact there is no such reason. 
I understand that you have returned his check which he 
brought in to your office yesterday after you had informed him 
that the lease was terminated. 
I can anticipate, however, that in disputing the termination 
he may make some claims that he is losing money by reason of your 
wrongful (allegedly) refusal to permit him to go ahead. Thus, I 
can anticipate that there will be legal problems and there may be 
some claims made against you. Thus in taking this action and 
adopting a strong position, you can expect problems. 
I will check on the County zoning requirements to see whether 
•EL ^ C J E A ^ Y 
Mr. & Mrs. Frank Erickson 
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October 13, 1978 
or not the sign violates those zoning requirements. 
I am returning your lease and have made a copy of it for 
my file. 
Yours truly, 
ELP:gbb 
Enclosure 
SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LORRAINE MILLER, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, ) LORRAINE MILLER 
v, ) 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah ) 
Corporation, formerly known as ) 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, ) 
Inc., a Utah Corporation, ) 
) Civil No. 87-04928 
Defendant. ) (Judge Raymond Uno) 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
LORRAINE MILLER, Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon 
oath, deposes and says that: 
1. I am the Plaintiff above-named and am making this 
supplemental Affidavit concerning the property that I own at 273 
South 20th East, Salt Lake City, Utah, which I purchased in late 
1905 from Gloria Erickson. Mrs. Erickson had purchased the pro-
perty from Mr. William Jennings who is now deceased. 
2. I had no personal contact with Mr. Jennings. I first 
learned about the billboard lease to Reagan Outdoor Advertising 
from Gloria Erickson who sold me the property. At all times she 
told me that the lease was for ten years at which time I could 
end the lease. She said that an attorney had reviewed it and con-
firmed this fact. I also had my attorney, Mr. Steven Swindle 
review the lease and he told me that it could not be ended by me 
until it's full term expired which was ten years from the time it 
was signed, April 29f 1977. 
3. When I purchased the property from Mrs. Erickson I 
also acquired a policy of title insurance which listed all of the 
existing liens and interest in that parcel of property. This 
title insurance policy listed the unrecorded lease between Mr. 
Jennings and Reagan Outdoor Advertising as a ten year lease dated 
April 29, 1977. A copy of this title insurance report is attached 
to this Affidavit as Exhibit A. 
4. At all times during my purchase of this property and 
until I attempted to terminate the lease earlier this year, I was 
told and believed that the lease could be terminated by me after 
ten years. 
DATED this n day of December, 1987. 
/I l iWtfML'
 w J j,J 
LORRAINE MILLER 
Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /^ day of 
December, 1987. ^<f X 2 / X 
NOTARY PUBLIC x^ " / 
Residing at: J^rA^f ^d/^ 
My Commission Expires: 
/hay f/<?f 
24302 
A L T A - OWNER'S SAFECO ,
 D N0.180-OP N? 605525 
POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE 
SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
ISSUED FROM THE OFFICE OF 
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY 
629 East 4th South Street 
Salt Lake City Utah 84102 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN 
SCHEDULE B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, 
SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, herein called the Company, 
insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the 
amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the 
Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the insured by 
reason of 
1 Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein, 
2 Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title 
3 Lack of a right of access to and from the land or 
4 Unmarketability of such title, 
and in addition, if a mortgage is referred to in Schedule A as the insured mortgage by reason of 
5 The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest except to the 
extent that such invalidity or unenforceability or claim thereof arises out of the transaction evidenced by the 
insured mortgage and is based upon 
a usury, or 
b any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law 
6 The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage, 
7 Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain priority over the lien of the 
insured mortgage, except any such lien arising from an improvement on the land contracted for and 
commenced subsequent to Date of Policy not financed in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness 
secured by the insured mortgage which at Date of Policy the insured has advanced or is obligated to 
advance, 
8 Any assessments for street improvements under construction or completed at Date of Policy which now have 
gained or hereafter may gain priority over the insured mortgage 
9 The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment shown in Schedule A of the insured mortgage or the 
failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mortgage in the name insured assignee free and clear of 
all hens 
In Witness Whereof, SAFECO Title Insurance Company has caused its corporate name and seal 
to be hereunto affixed by its duly authorized officers as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A 
?&£L.-/ ff Secretary President 
ML A 
Art A r*t*,r\rn'rf*si C i n n o l i 
SCHEDULE A (Owners - Purchasers - Lessee) 
Page 2 
OrderNo T-92344 Premium: S 423.00 
Amount of Insurance: $ 97 000.00 Date of Policy: September 30, 1983 
at 8:00 A.M. 
Name of Insured: 
LORRAINE A. MILLER, as her Interest may appear 
The estate or interest in the land described herein and which is covered by this policy is: 
Fee Simple 
The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in: 
ALYCE BAI, subject to the marital in t eres t of her husband, i f married 
The land referred to in this policy is in the State of Utah, County of Salt Lake 
and described as follows: 
Lot 4, Block A, JOHNSON SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
SCHEDULE B (Standard) 
Page 3 
Policy No
 0 p 605525 
This policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following (all clauses if any which indicate any 
preference limitation or discrimination based on race color religion or national origin are omitted from all building and 
use restrictions covenants and conditions if any shown herein) 
1 Rights or claims of persons in possession or claiming to be in possession easements liens or encumbrances 
.ncludmg material or labor hens, which are not shown by the public records reservations in patents or state 
grants or in acts authorizing the issuance thereof mineral rights water rights claims or title to minerals or 
water 
2 Questions of location boundary and areas overlaps and encroachments by improvements belonging to 
these or adjoining premises all dependent upon actual survey for determination 
3 Assessments whicn are not shown as existing hens by the public records taxes not yet payable pending 
proceedings for vacating opening or changing streets or highways preceding entry of the final ordinance or 
order therefor 
4. Taxes for the year 1983 are now due and payable, but will not 
become delinquent until November 30th. 
5. Said property is included within the boundaries of Salt Lake City 
Suburban Sanitary District No. 1, and is subject to the charges and 
assessments thereof• 
6. COVENANTS, CONDITIONS, RESTRICTIONS and/or EASEMENTS, EXCEPT THOSE 
BASED ON RACE, COLOR, CREED OR NATIONAL ORIGIN, CONTAINED IN INSTRUMENT: 
Dated: January 3, 1940 
Recorded: January 3, 1940 
Entry No*: 872313 
Book/Page: 239/316 
A copy of which is attached hereto. 
7. CONTRACT OF SALE AND THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED THEREIN 
Seller: ALYCE BAI aka ALYCE B. ROBERTSON 
Purchaser: WILLIAM M. JENNINGS and PATSIE A. JENNINGS, his 
wife, as joint tenants 
Dated: December 1, 1968 
Recorded: October 19, 1977 
Entry No.: 3012251 
Book/Page: 4566/1173 
The interest of WILLIAM M. JENNINGS and PATSIE A. JENNINGS, his 
wife was conveyed to GLORIA S. ERICKSON and GLORIA GAYE ERICKSON, 
her daughter, as joint tenants by Quit Claim Deed dated May 10, 
1978 and recorded May 16, 1978 as Entry No. 3108498, in Book 4673 
at page 358 of Official Records. 
8 . UNRECORDED LEASE 
Lessor: 
Lessee: 
Term: 
Dated: 
WM. M. JENNINGS dba BILL'S SUPPLY 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC. 
10 years 
April 29, 1977 
9. UNRECORDED UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
Seller: GLORIA S. ERICKSON and GLORIA GAYE ERICKSON, 
her daughter 
Purchaser: LORRAINE A. MILLER 
Dated: September 15, 1983 
NOTICE OF CONTRACT 
Recorded: 
Entry No.: 
Book/Page: 
September 16, 
3844954 
5491/1390 
1983 
jj 
V Q ^ I 
Outdoor Advertising^ Inc. 
Page 1 
This agreement made and entered into by the under* icned lessor, (the **Lessor") 
and by Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., (the **Lessee"). Both lessor and lessee 
acknowledge the receipt and sufficiency of good and valuable consideration and agree 
as follows; 
The lessor does hereby grant and convey to the lessee arxr its assigns and successor!, 
the exclusive right to use the following described property for the purpose of erecting 
and maintaining thereon outdoor advertising structures including such necessary device*, 
structures, connections, supports and appurtenances as may be dfsired by lessee for a ^ 
term of ten years commencing on or before 
at option of lessee, upon the following described land, togethe/ with ingress and^K?> 
egress to and upon the same, located in the county of ^.QA-£.fr/lACci. ., ^ M 
State of Utah and more rticu!arK described as follows: 
* - > ! 
- ^ 
^ 
(Lessst nay plaac oo or fttad to tliii instromcai, •ubse^jcu: to .caeattion, a xc-ctet v>d bound* dcAtripiioc °f J A 
tbc location.) Vs/s* V 
Lessee shall pax lesser the aroouBt of %.fS\fc£'.<€>C)_ annually, payable ^ < * 
(monthJy.^juarterlyJ semi-annually); however, prior to construction and obtaining £ £ 
gprmits by lessee the rental shall be FKT Dollars. y 
Tnis lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive
 v -
period; thereafter, this lease shaE continue in full force on the same terms and condi- (^ 
tions for a like successive period or periods, unless lessor delivers to lessee notice of v 
termination within ninety days of the end of said term. 
It is further expressly agreed that lessee may terminate this lease by giving written ^ S ^ J ; 
notice and paying a penalty of one year's rent at any time within thirty days v*Ty «' 
prior to the end of any twelve month period subsequent to the commencement date of ^ ^ \ 
this lease. Provided further, if the said space becomes obstructed so as to lessen the C^ 
advertising value of any of lessee's signs erected on said premises, or if traffic is diverted ^ * v j 
or reduced, or if the use of any such signs is prevented or restricted by law, or if for *0 f\^ 
any reason a building permit for erection or modification is refused this lease may, a t ^ ?t> . 
the option of lessee, be terminated or the rent reduced to Five Dollars while said ^ ^ 
condition exists and in such event lessor shall refund prorata any prepaid rental S\ %. 
for the unexpired term. Lessor agrees that no such obstruction insofar as the szmt is ^ 
All advertising signs placed upon the described premises are to remain the property v^ T « 
o within lessor's control will be permitted or allowed. Lessor authorizes lessee to trim and 
cut whatever trees, bushes, brush as it deems necessary for unobstructed view of its ( i 'Yi 
advertising display. f i \ ^ 
of lessee and may be removed by lessee at any time. If lessee is prevented by law, or vL 
long 
Lessor warrants the title of said leasehold for the term herein mentioned. In the 
to sell the property upon which lessee's structure(s) are located and enters into an ^ ^ \ 
agreement to sell or receives an offer to purchase either which lessor is willing to accept *• & 
lessor agrees to first offer the property to lessee on the same terms and conditions and ' ^ 
lessee shall have thirty days in which to enter into an agreement to purchase with ^ v.^ 
lessor. It is expressly understood that neither the lessor nor lessee is bound by any >v£\ 
stipulations, representations, or agreements not printed or written in this lease. 
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shaB be binding upon the he in , 
personal representatives, successors, and assigns of the parties hereto. 
£ 
Executed this 
LESSEE 
day of JJV.&±L-._ 
UTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC. 
„zZ 
LESSOR:.4^..^>.<: 
EXHIBIT A 
Mailing Address t? fit 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORRAINE MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, formerly known as 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-87-4928 
Summary Judgment motions were heard by this Court on 
December 1, 1987. Memoranda were submitted by both parties and 
arguments made. The Court requested any additional information 
which would assist the Court in making a ruling on this case. 
Supplemental information was provided by both parties. After 
reviewing the file, pleadings, memoranda and arguments, the Court 
hereby finds and rules as follows: 
The Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. contract is neither a 
long nor complicated contract. As a matter of fact, it consists 
of only one page. The essential terms of the contract provide a 
lease to lessee and its assigns and successors for a term of ten 
years, commencing on or before the 1st day of May, 1977 at the 
option of the lessee of the land at 2735 South 2000 East for 
$240.00 annually, payable quarterly. Further this lease shall 
continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive 
EXHIBIT B 
MILLER V. R.O.A. GENERAL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
period. Thereafter, this lease shall continue in full force on 
the same terms and conditions for a like successive period or 
periods, unless lessor delivers to lessee notice of termination 
within ninety days of the end of said term. (Underlined for 
emphasis) 
A person who affixes his signature to a contract is presumed 
to have read, understood and agreed to the terms of a contract he 
signs. There is no evidence before this Court to show the lessor 
was incompetent, under undue influence, or coerced when he signed 
the contract, or that he did so involuntarily. On the contrary, 
there is evidence this provision was specifically discussed and 
that the lessor knew and understood the lease would continue for 
a like successive period or periods. If he did not agree with 
the terms, he could very easily have not signed the lease, had 
the provision removed, modified the provision, or had it made 
more clear if he did not understand it. This he failed to do 
either because he felt it not necessary, or because he was 
satisfied with the contract as written. As it was pointed out, 
two additional provisions were handwritten on the face of the 
contract with signatures of the parties affixed to it, further 
manifesting the intent of the parties, and supporting the 
proposition they were satisfied, otherwise, with the contract as 
written. 
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On its face, the contract is clear who shall be bound by the 
terms of the contract. Specifically, it states "this agreement 
shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the 
heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the 
parties hereto." (Underlined for emphasis) It is undisputed 
plaintiff is a successor to a successor of the original lessor. 
Therefore, she is bound by the terms of the lease. 
The terms of the contract are clear and unequivocal. The 
terms cannot be said to be in fine print nor lost in a multi-
paged document. The print is clear and of the same size for the 
entirety of the contract. It follows sequentially with the 
original lease term and there is no attempt to conceal or mislead 
the lessor. It is designated in a separate paragraph in plain 
and understandable language. Finally, the contract consists of 
only one page. It may be read, very slowly, in five minutes. 
There is no question the lease is a ten year lease. More 
importantly, however, upon carefully reading the lease anyone, 
including a lay person, will understand there is an option to 
continue the lease for a "like successive period" to be exercised 
by the lessee. Obviously, there was some attention paid to this 
term of the lease because the affidavits so state "their" 
understanding. If there clearly was any question, a legal 
opinion should have been requested at the time the issue arose 
specifically asking what "continue for a like successive period" 
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meant. There is nothing in evidence to demonstrate this simple 
procedure was undertaken. 
Parties are entitled to the benefit of the bargain they 
enter into. Since the original lessor is now deceased, the 
presumption is he received the benefit of his bargain at the time 
the lease was entered into. We cannot, from hindsight, say he 
received a bad bargain. If he had continued to live and held 
this property, he may still be satisfied with the lease. Because 
his successor is unhappy, should not be any reason to deny an 
innocent lessee from the benefit of his side of the bargain. 
Unconscionability must be determined based on the 
circumstances of the case at the time the lease was entered into. 
There is no evidence to show the lessor did not benefit from the 
lease, or that the terms of the lease were unconscionable to the 
lessor at the date, time, place and his circumstances. At this 
time, this Court cannot find the contract was unconscionable at 
the time the lease was signed. 
A contract may become unconscionable because of subsequent 
events. Again, the affidavits submitted by plaintiff do not 
support any grounds to show unconscionableness. As successors, 
they knew, or should have known, the express terms of the 
contract. If they had any questions or were unhappy with being 
successors to a contract they disliked, they had the option of 
negotiating then or not purchasing the property. This they 
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failed to do. Pleading ignorance or lack of understanding to a 
contract after affixing ones signature to it is, generally, as a 
matter of law, insufficient to set aside a contract. 
It is the general rule that where the provision of renewal 
or continuance of a lease is stated in general terms, the lease 
will be construed as providing for only one renewal. 50 
Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, Section 1171 (1970) as cited in 
Burke v. Permian Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 671 P.2d 1119 (1981). The 
Court, however, does not find any ambiguity in the phrase for a 
"like successive period.11 If, perchance, there is any ambiguity, 
the lessee would still be entitled to one ten year renewal 
period under this lease agreement. 
Based on the foregoing findings, the Court now makes and 
enters its Order hereby denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Defendant is to prepare proper Findings and Judgment 
pursuant to this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this 4th day of January, 1988. 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this *Cp day of January, 1988: 
Suzanne Marelius 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Douglas T, Hall 
Attorney for Defendant 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORRAINE MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC,. A Utah 
Corporation, Formerly Known as 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., 
A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant, 
1 AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-4928 
(Judge Uno) 
The Parties' respective Motions for Summary Judgment 
were heard by the court on December 1, 1987. The Plaintiff 
appeared through counsel, Suzanne Marelius. The Defendant 
appeared through its counsel, Douglas T. Hall. The Court heard 
the argument of counsel and thereafter requested that additional 
information be submitted by counsel to assist the court in making 
a ruling on the case. Subsequently, additional information was 
provided by both parties. After reviewing the file, the pleadings 
therein, the memorandum and arguments of parties' counsel and the 
objections to the Courts original Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law amendments thereto have been made and the court does now 
hereby make the following amended 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
DOUGLAS T. HALL #1305 
Attorney for Defendant 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone (801)521-1775 
1. That the Reagan Outdoor Advertising Contract, which 
is the subject matter of this lawsuit, is neither a long nor 
complicated contracted and, as a matter of fact, consists of only 
one page. 
2. The essential terms of the contract provide a lease 
to lessee and its assigns and successors for a term of ten (10) 
years, commencing on or before the first day of may, 1977, at the 
option of the lessee, of the land at 2735 South, 2000 East, for 
$240.00 Annually, payable quarterly, 
3. The lease further provides for its continuance on 
the same terms and conditions for a like successive period. 
4. Furthermore, the lease provides that it shall 
thereafter continue in full force on the same terms and conditions 
for a like successive period or periods, unless lessor delivers to 
lessee notice of termination within ninety (90) days at the end of 
said term. 
5. There is no evidence before the court to show that 
the original lessor, William M. Jennings, was incompetent, under 
undue influence, or coerced when he signed the contract, or that 
he did so involuntarily. 
6. That the provisions providing for the term of the 
lease were specifically discussed and that the original lessor 
knew and understood the lease would continue for a "like 
successive period or periods". 
7. That the original lessor did not require the 
provisions regarding the "like successive period or periods" of 
the lease term to be removed or modified either because he felt it 
was not necessary, or because he was satisfied with the contract 
as written, 
8. Additional provisions were handwritten on the face 
of the contract with the signatures of the parties affixed to it, 
further manifesting the intent of the parties' and supporting the 
proposition that they were satisfied, otherwise, with the contract 
as written. 
9. The lease agreement further states that "this 
agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon 
the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the 
parties hereto." 
10. The plaintiff is a successor to or a successor of 
the original lessor. 
11. The print on the lease agreement is clear and of 
the same size for the entirety of the contract. There is no 
attempt to conceal or mislead the lessor. 
12. The provisions of the contract with regard to the 
original lease term and its subsequent terms is designated in a 
separate paragraph in plain and understandable language. 
13. The lease contract as a whole can be read, very 
slowly, in five minutes. 
14. There is no evidence that a legal opinion was 
requested at the time the issue arose with regard to the "like 
successive period" provision of the lease agreement. 
15. The original lessor is now deceased. 
16. There is no evidence to show the original lessor 
did not benefit from the lease or that the terms of the lease were 
unconscionable to the lessor at that date, time, place and under 
the circumstances attending the original lessor at that time* 
17. Successor lessors failed to obtain a legal opinion 
specifically asking what "continue for a like successive period" 
meant. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact the court 
makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The terms of the lease agreement are clear and 
unequivocal. 
2. The terms cannot be said to be in find print nor 
lost in a multi-page document. 
3. The plaintiff is^bound by the terms of the lease 
agreement as written. 
4. The courts presumption is that the original lessor 
received the benefit of his bargain at the time the lease was 
entered into. 
5. Because the successor lessor is unhappy is no 
reason to deny an innocent lessee from the benefit of his side 
of the bargain. 
6. The court cannot say that the original lessor 
received a bad bargain. 
7. The court cannot find that the contract was 
unconscionable at the time the lease was signed. The affidavits 
submitted by the plaintiff did not support any grounds to support 
unconscionableness. 
8. Plaintiff's pleading in this case regarding 
ignorance or lack of understanding is insufficient to sent aside 
this lease agreement. 
9. The court finds no ambiguity in the phrase for a 
"like successive period". 
10. The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be denied and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be granted. ~ 
DATED this AT- " day
 0f ttoRRsii, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
V^ycrz^-*J*C^ A-tt-o 
Raymond S. Uno, 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
^c<C ^  c ^  
Suzanne Marelius, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
^ s , H- DIXON
 ; 
^
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DOUGLAS T. HALL #1305 
Attorney for Defendant 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone: (801)521-1775 
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_ .MAR 2 2 1988 
| ^eput> Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORRAINE MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., A Utah 
Corporation, Formerly Known as 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., 
A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON PARTIES MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-87-4928 
(Judge Uno) 
The Parties' respective Motions for Summary Judgment 
were heard by the court on December 1, 1987. The Plaintiff 
appeared through counsel, Suzanne Marelius. The Defendant 
appeared through its counsel, Douglas T. Hall. The Court heard 
the argument of counsel and thereafter requested that additional 
information be submitted by counsel to assist the Court in making 
a ruling on the case. Subsequently, additional information was 
provided by both parties. After reviewing the file, the pleadings 
therein, the memorandum and arguments of parties' counsel and 
having previously made and entered it Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and being duly apprised in the premises, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
2* The Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. 
3, Said outdoor advertising lease contract is not 
unconscionable and shall not be set aside, 
4. That the outdoor advertising lease agreement which 
is the subject matter of this action is a ten (10) year lease 
which is not ambiguous in providing for an additional ten (10) 
year term for a "like successive period". 
DATED this ^ <^^ day of Feta3*a-ry, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
^^^Aij^y^ 
Raymond S. Uno, 
District Judge_ ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: r ^ H- D;;<f\ ^  ,' "Y 
Sirzanne Marelius, ^ ^
 v x t / > /lA,iA/»/i ^ -
Attorney for Plaintiff £<<£/< / ^ ^ OA^^f70y 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORRAINE MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC,. A Utah 
Corporation, Formerly Known as 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., ] 
A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
I AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-4928 
(Judge Uno) 
The Parties' respective Motions for Summary Judgment 
were heard by the court on December 1, 1987. The Plaintiff 
appeared through counsel, Suzanne Marelius. The Defendant 
appeared through its counsel, Douglas T. Hall. The Court heard 
the argument of counsel and thereafter requested that additional 
information be submitted by counsel to assist the court in making 
a ruling on the case. Subsequently, additional information was 
provided by both parties. After reviewing the file, the pleadings 
therein, the memorandum and arguments of parties' counsel and the 
objections to the Courts original Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law amendments thereto have been made and the court does now 
hereby make the following amended 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
DOUGLAS T. HALL 11305 
Attorney for Defendant 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone (801)521-1775 
SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LORRAINE MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., A Utah 
Corporation, formerly known as 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
INC., A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C87-4928 
(Judge Uno) 
ooOoo 
Lorraine Miller, Plaintiff herein, gives notice of her 
appeal to the Supreme Court, State of Utah, from the decision on 
Summary Judgment rendered by the Honorable Raymond Uno, Judge 
presiding, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. Plaintiff appeals the following Judgment: 
1. Amended Order and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on Motions for Summary Judgment entered April 4, 1988. 
DATED this ty day of May, 1988. 
"3^. 
' c t t *-£ c -> 
SUZANNE MARELIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-1-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to Attorney for the Defendant, Mr. Douglas T. 
Hall, 1775 North 900 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84116, postage 
prepaid this J^fday of May, 1988. 
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SUZANNE MARPLJ US - ;08] 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Ut a °4]02 
Telephone: f 80 1 i ;r 
I *-K!) JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN ANb FOR SALT LAKr 
LORRAINE MILLER- ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) LORRAINE MILLER 
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C o r p o r a t i o n , foniiMi 1;, h-ow-i
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R ^ a q a n O u t d o o r A d v e r t i s i n g , - ) 
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STATI" OF UTAH I 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
LORRAINE MTT.r.ER, f' 1 a i n t i f 1 , I | 1 1 ! 11111 I \' ,k | 
I 1 1 Ifjp11 s e s a 11 *.I iJay 1 3 i '11 a l. ; 
1 ' .in 'he Plaintiff above named and am the owner nf 
( ' a c t u s - i i n l T i f' 111 i 1 v t 1 '! 11I III III1 1I1 1 II 111 mi« 1 in I  1 M . n'l'i 1) . i l l ' 1 | 1111 ill In 
-'III In Kii.sl, N.i 1 t Lake C i t y , U tah 84109 I am . a l s o t h e own*-r nj 
t h e a d j a c e n t p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d at 71 iS S o u t h ">0rh Enrit,, n a n h a k e 
1 i t. |, , 1)1* a I in II'II II'I I Ii I I>H 1 1 1 «""l 1 I d l e I1" I Hi" 1 aii J ui'i w h i c h 1 now 
o p e r a t e a b u s i n e s s c a l l e d t h e S o u t h w e s t SI1 »| . 
2 W'bpt] 1 p u r c h a s e d 1 In p i o p c r 1 1 1  " / I'I " M 
I'.dsl Il was t o l d by t h e s e l l e i t h a i "1 wou.ld he t h e s u c c e s s o r ' 1 
interest to a lease executed between William Jennings and Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising/ Inc., dated April 29, 1977. That Lease pro-
vided for the rental of a billboard on those premises and I was 
told that it was a ten year Lease which would terminate in May 
1987. 
3. Throughout my ownership of the property at 2735 
South 20th East the Defendant Reagan Advertising, Inc., as 
lessee, has maintained an advertising billboard at that location 
and has received advertising revenue from that 
billboard and paid me rental pursuant to the Lease. 
4. I notified Reagan by letter dated January 26, 1987, 
that I desired to terminate the Lease as of May 1, 1987. I also 
had my attorney send a certified letter dated April 29, 1987, to 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. informing them that I desired to 
terminate the lease and requesting that they remove the billboard 
and restore the condition of the ground to its original form. 
5. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., has refused to 
terminate the Lease and has informed me that they interpret it as 
a twenty year Lease. 
6. The presence of the billboard on my property is 
damaging my business by preventing me from effectively adver-
tising; by limiting my access to my business and by preventing me 
from enlarging my driveway to expand my business operations. 
7. I believed, and was told by the prior owners of 
the premises, that the lease was for a term of ten (10) years and 
expired on May I r s.pa Si". I fh| 
on my property, 
J u ] y, 1987. 
i I i l l l l l l l 1 h S i I HI II 
/ )a Y >; * 
n n 
DATED this £? day of Ju?y, - o ^ . 
/>' U ' 
LORRAINE MILLER 
Plaintiff 
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 t ... /- •? - ,-
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
^ 
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